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Abstract We consider the situation where there are several alternatives for investing 
a quantity of money to achieve a set of objectives. The choice of which alternative to 
apply depends on how citizens and political representatives perceive that such objec-
tives should be achieved. All citizens with the right to vote can express their preferences 
in the decision-making process. These preferences may be incomplete. Political rep-
resentatives represent the citizens who have not taken part in the decision-making 
process. The weight corresponding to political representatives depends on the number 
of citizens that have intervened in the decision-making process. The methodology we 
propose needs the participants to specify for each alternative how they rate the differ-
ent attributes and the relative importance of attributes. On the basis of this information 
an expected utility interval is output for each alternative. To do this, an evidential rea-
soning approach is applied. This approach improves the insightfulness and rationality 
of the decision-making process using a belief decision matrix for problem modeling 
and the Dempster–Shafer theory of evidence for attribute aggregation. Finally, we 
propose using the distances of each expected utility interval from the maximum and 
the minimum utilities to rank the alternative set. The basic idea is that an alternative 
is ranked first if its distance to the maximum utility is the smallest, and its distance 
to the minimum utility is the greatest. If only one of these conditions is satisfied, a 
distance ratio is then used. 
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1 Introduction 
The growth and development of information and communication technologies (ICT) 
has led to their widespread application, thus increasing their economic and social 
impact. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
undertakes a wide range of activities aimed at improving our understanding of how 
ICT contribute to sustainable economic growth and social well-being and their role 
in the shift toward knowledge-based societies. Advances in ICT allow a much more 
substantive implementation of the democratic ideals. E-democracy articulates politi-
cal and democratic procedures involving citizens in societal decision making through 
the use of ICT. 
The debate on e-democracy has become very active recently. Although the initial 
common ideal democracy was the so-called plebiscitary model, in which citizens 
actively participate in public decision making through electronic voting, a more recent 
argument on e-democracy emphasized deliberation through ICT. For example, Barber 
(2000) argued that e-democracy should focus on citizens’ participation in discussion 
and deliberation on public matters rather than on electronic voting. This so-called 
deliberative e-democracy model embraces ICT as a tool for implementing the public 
sphere described in Habermas (1989), where it is defined as “a place where private 
entities may draw together as a public entity and engage in rational deliberation, 
ultimately reaching consensus on common affairs”. 
Kim (2008) takes a pragmatic approach. An e-democracy model does not have 
to focus only on either participatory decision making or deliberation, since they are 
complementary rather than conflicting. Modern decision theory and group support 
systems can facilitate participation in decision making, while enhancing collective 
deliberation. Focusing on the process of public decision-making with citizen participa-
tion, this paper seeks answers to some of the critical questions in e-democracy. 
Governments are paying special attention to promoting citizen participation, espe-
cially at the local level [Viraptirin 2006]. This is apparent, for example, from the 
more frequent implementation of participatory budgets, which are an attempt to give 
citizens a say in deciding how part of a public budget is spent. This is a budget 
allocation approach based on citizen involvement. It diverges from the predominant 
representative model in which citizens elect representatives for a certain period, and 
have practically no other direct opportunity to influence council policies. For example, 
Spain’s Local Finance Regulatory Law does not prevent residents from participating 
in drafting a municipal budget, but it does not regulate such participation either. As 
a consequence, participation is usually limited to the obligation to publish the budget 
for a two-week consultation period, during which citizens can submit amendments. 
If there are none, the proposed budget comes into force; otherwise, a new plenary 
session would be necessary to sort out the amendments. 
Participatory budgets are transforming the idea of a representative democracy, 
where citizens’ preferences are considered just at elections for moving closer to a 
participatory democracy, based on direct participation and discussion of issues. As 
Souza (2001), one of the pioneers of participatory budgets, mentions, this is a process 
of direct, voluntary and universal democracy, providing the population with the oppor-
tunity to discuss budgetary issues and public policies, and make relevant decisions. 
Though there are mentions of previous experiences, the most famous participatory 
budget was for Porto Alegre, initiated in 1989 and consolidated in 1992. Since then, 
it has been applied annually quite successfully (Abers 1998; de Sousa Santos 1998; 
Baierle 2004; Latendresse 2004). It received the United Nations prize for the best 
urban governance practices. Participatory budgets are becoming increasingly popular 
in many other municipalities all around the world. For example, more than 240 munici-
palities undertook such experiences of participatory budgets in 2004, not only in South 
America, but also in Italy, France, Germany, Belgium and Spain (UN-HABITAT 2004). 
Numerous cities are also planning to implement such a budget. Estimates are that cit-
izen participation will be allowed in the discussion of 10% of the budget by 2010. 
Although participatory budget experiences are all grounded on relatively simple 
principles, a comparison of their regulations shows up many alternatives, including 
differences in the percentage of directly allocated budget, the number of participants, 
the number of rounds, etc. 
(Ríos and Ríos Insua 2008) view participatory budgets as group resource allocation 
problems in which citizens try to agree on a budget on the basis of multiple criteria, 
possibly subject to other constraints apart from the maximum budget limit. They 
propose a framework for solving the participatory budget problem based on decision 
and negotiation analysis principles. 
In this paper we introduce a group decision-making methodology that allows 
for incomplete individual beliefs, which will be illustrated by its application to e-
democracy. We will consider M alternatives (e.g. budgets) to be evaluated in terms of 
L attributes (objectives). The aim is ranking the alternatives on the basis of the citi-
zens’ and political representatives’ preferences for L attributes. Because as many as 
possible of varying cultural levels should be involved, interaction with citizens should 
be carried out using user-friendly ICT to assure that all the citizens are able to express 
their beliefs and preferences. 
The methodology can be used to represent and aggregate citizens’ beliefs and 
preferences, and to rank the different alternatives on the basis of their expected utility. 
The paper consists of three more sections. Section 2 introduces the methodology. This 
section is divided into further sections explaining the aggregation of beliefs and the 
ranking of alternatives on the basis of expected utilities, respectively. In Sect. 3 an 
example of the methodology application is illustrated. Finally, Sect. 4 outlines the 
conclusions reached. 
2 Methodology 
The methodology we propose consists of the four phases shown in Fig. 1. 
The first phase consists of defining the problem. Objectives must be identified. We 
recommend constructing an objective hierarchy, in which major objectives provide 
a basis for defining lower level objectives, since they are a means for achieving the 
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higher level goals (Brownlow and Watson 1987). Lower level objectives are more 
specific. Therefore, it is easy to identify reasonable attributes for these lowest level 
objectives to indicate to what extent they are achieved. See Keeney and Raiffa (1993) 
for some basic properties related to the set of attributes. Next, the different alternatives 
that can be applied must be identified. 
This phase should involve politicians and experts, while considering the opinion of 
some properly chosen groups of citizens. This should lead to a clear enough problem 
definition for the whole society, explicitly determining the possible alternatives to be 
considered and the attributes for measuring the different objective achievement. One 
role of citizens is to verify that the way in which they are going to present the problem to 
the other citizens is clear enough. This phase will be carried out by attending meetings 
and exploiting ITC. 
The first phase ends when an objective hierarchy is built up, which can be repre-
sented in a generic way as in Fig. 2, and attribute performances for each alternative 
Ai are measured, i.e., the following matrix is available 
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where xij is the performance for the alternative Ai in attribute X j . 
In the second phase, citizens’ and political representatives’ preferences must be 
assessed. First, each of them must value the attribute performances by assigning them 
an achievement level from a well-defined set according to his/her beliefs and pref-
erences. Let ykj i be the belief degree associated with xij for the kth participant. The 
methodology we propose accounts for incomplete information. Thus, there is no prob-
lem if no belief degree is assigned for an attribute performance. 
Next, the participants have to provide the relative importance for the attributes. 
They will weight the attributes, and the system will perform a normalization process. 
There are many weighting methods that use different questioning procedures to elicit 
weights, see Stewart (1992) and Weber and Borchering (1993) for a review. Most 
account for imprecise information, see e.g. Pöyhönen and Hämäläinen (2001), Jiménez 
et al. (2006b) and Mustajoki et al. (2005). 
Note that all citizens with the right to vote and political representatives take part in 
this phase. 
The second phase ends once citizens and political representatives have assigned 
belief degree for the attribute performances, i.e. a belief level matrix 
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is available for each participant k and, on the other hand, a weight vector representing 
the relative importance of the objectives is also available for each participant k 
wk = (w1,...,wkL) 
where wik is the weight for the ith attribute for participant k. 
The third phase corresponds to the alternative evaluation phase. It involves the 
following stages: 
1. First, a probability mass in the achievement level set can be identified for each 
attribute and alternative on the basis of the individual belief level matrices 
correspon-ding to each citizen and political representative. From now on we will 
denote it as the belief decision matrix. 
X 
. . 
To assess it, as explained in more detail afterwards, we will compute the values 
for the citizens and political representatives, taking into account that political 
representatives represent the opinion of the citizens that do not take part in the 
budget decision-making process. 
2. Weight elicitation Note that different weights have been provided by each par-
ticipant for the attributes in the preference assessment. We finally consider as the 
attribute weight the weight interval whose lower end-point is 5th percentile and 
upper end-point the 95th percentile. Different percentiles could be used depend-
ing on the citizen percentage included in the weight interval. Note that we again 
consider that the weights elicited by political representatives represent the opinion 
of the citizens that do not take part in the process. 
3. Attribute aggregation process At this point the belief decision matrix is avail-
able. The aim of this stage is then to aggregate all the attributes according to a 
methodology based on the Dempster–Shafer theory of evidence. 
4. Alternative expected utility Since the weights for the attributes are assumed to 
be imprecise and represented by means of intervals, to assess alternative expected 
utilities it is necessary to solve two non-linear optimization problems, leading 
to the lower and upper utilities, respectively. Thus, 2M optimization problems 
must be solved to obtain the expected utility intervals for all the alternatives under 
consideration. 
5. Alternative Ranking This step consists of ranking the alternatives under consid-
eration on the basis of their expected utility intervals. We propose using a distance 
notion that takes into account all the interval values. For this reason, we consider 
the distance as an integral. The most preferred alternative is the one that is furthest 
from the minimal and closest to the maximum utility. Since, this is not the case 
in most cases, we propose using a ratio that depends on the above to rank all the 
alternatives. 
The fourth phase is the application of the most preferred alternative. This phase would 
be developed by the administration and would consist of the execution of the chosen 
alternative through the participatory decision-making process. 
The steps that are being taken to execute the alternative should be constantly 
reported to citizens. If a large majority is unsatisfied with the selected alternative, an 
intermediate phase of negotiation could be carried out before the alternative execution, 
see e.g. Jiménez et al. (2005). However, if a very large number of citizens take part in 
the participatory decision making, the negotiation process could be very complex and 
a consensus solution is unlikely to be reached. For this reason we discard this option. 
Next, we describe in more detail the third phase of the methodology (see Fig. 1), 
which corresponds with the automatic processing of all the information provided by 
the citizens and the political representatives. 
2.1 Belief Decision Matrix 
Let d be the number of political representatives that represent z citizens of a locality 
where a participatory process is going to be enacted. Both citizens and political rep-
Table 1 Achievement level set 
Levels of achievement 
H1 : Major negative impact 
H2 : Significant negative impact 
H3 : Moderately negative impact 
H4 : Negative impact 
H5 : Slightly negative impact 
H6 : No impact (status quo) 
H7 : Slightly positive impact 
H8 : Positive impact 
H9 : Moderately positive impact 
H10 : Significant positive impact 
H11 : Major positive impact 
resentatives take part in the decision-making process. However, they have different 
weights, as explained afterwards. 
Let us consider M alternatives, A1,..., AM, of which we want to select one on the 
basis of their performances for several attributes, denoted by X1,..., XL. Participants 
have valued in the second phase the attribute performances by means an achievement 
level set H = {H1,..., HN] according to their beliefs and preferences. This has led 
to a belief level matrix for each participant k 
A1 
A' 
AM 
where y1" e H. 
For example, the achievement level set H used in Wang et al. (2006a), which 
analyses an environmental impact assessment problem, is shown in Table 1. 
All the achievement levels are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. Thus, 
they form what is termed a frame of discernment in Dempster-Shafer theory. Without 
loss of generality, it is assumed that level H+1 is preferred to level Hi. 
Since z is the number of citizens with the right to take part in the decision-making 
process (primarily, citizens with the right to vote and registered in the above locality) 
and v is the number of citizens who really participate, then the number of citizens that 
do not take part in the process is z — v. We assume that the political representatives 
represent these z — v citizens. 
Thus, the weight of their vote is (z — v)/zd, while the weight for a citizen that really 
takes part in the budget decision-making process is 1/z. 
If the alternative A1 is assigned the level Hn by c\ citizens and d\ political repre-
sentatives for the attribute X;, we consider that the belief degree in Hn for the attribute 
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Xi in the alternative A1 is j3„j (A1) = c\ /z + dlin(z—v)/zd. Therefore, the assignment 
to alternative A1 for the attribute X; is 
S(Xt(A1)) = {(H1, P1{A1)),..., (HN, pN,i(A1)), (H, faM1))} 
where j3„j (A1) is the belief degree associated with level Hn, and Xn=1 Pn,i (A1) < 1, 
and 1 — ^n=1Pn,i(Al) = PHJ(A1) repre-sents the unknown portion of achieve-
ment that could be assigned to any levels in the whole range denoted by H. Clearly, 
X«=1 Pn,i(Al) will be less than one when the citizens and political representatives 
taking part in the process do not assign a level to the attribute Xi for the attribute A1 
since 
yPni{Ai) = yc^+ydin(z~v) 
n—1 n—1 n—1 
zd 
# 
/ cin = v and 2,d\n = d. 
n—1 n—1 
Note that PHJ(A1) denotes total ignorance about the assess-ment of A1 on X;. 
The assignment results for each alternative A1 and attribute Xi are represented by 
the following belief decision matrix: 
A1 
A' 
X1 
I S{X1{A1)) 
S(X1(A')) 
AM S(X1(AM)) 
Xj 
S(Xj (A1)) 
S(Xj(A')) 
S(Xj(AM)) 
Xi 
SiXiiA1)) \ 
S(XL(A')) 
S(XL(AM)) 
2.2 Determining Weights 
Each citizen (including the political representatives) can assign weight to the attributes 
according to their preferences, if necessary. The weights of the citizens are normalized, 
whereas we consider the weights for political representatives as (z — v)/d citizens 
making this election. Afterwards, the 5th (P5) and the 95th (P95) percentiles for the 
weights assigned to each attribute i are assessed, and w; e [P5, P95] is considered as 
the weight for the ith attribute. For simplicity we will denote this by w; e [u>~, wj"\. 
2.3 Aggregating Attributes 
Based on the belief decision matrix and the rule of evidence combination in Dempster– 
Shafer (D-S) theory, the analytical evidential reasoning (ER) algorithm is developed 
to aggregate L attributes (Wang et al. 2007). The ER approach provides a non-linear 
attribute aggregation process. 
N N 
The ER algorithm first transforms the original belief degrees into basic probability 
masses by combining weights and belief degrees using the following equations: 
eni = ei(H„) = WiP„,i(Al),n= 1,..., N, i = 1,..., L, 
N N 
enJ = 1 - wt^PnjiA1), i = 1,...,L, 
n—1 n=1 
en i = g; (H) = 1 — Wi, i = 1,..., L, 
e~ji,j = Si (H) = if; 1 
/ N \ 
I 1 ~^PnJ ( A ' ) \,i = 1,...,L, 
n—1 
with eji,i = SHJ + SHJ, where u>i is the weight for the ith attribute and 2 i=1 wi =1 , 
and enj represents the basic probability mass of A1 being assessed as level Hn for 
the attribute Xi. Note that the probability mass assigned to the whole set H, enj 
which is not currently assigned to any individual levels, is split into two parts; enj 
and enj, where enj is caused by the relative importance of attribute i and enj by 
the incompleteness of the assessment of the attribute X* for A1. enj represents what 
role the other factors can play in assessing the general factor (objective), and it is the 
proportion of beliefs that remain to be assigned depending upon how other factors 
are assesses. In essence, enj provides scope for conflict resolution in the presence of 
conflicting evidence. enj will be zero if nothing is missing in the assessment. 
Next, the basic probability masses on the L basic attributes are aggregated 
into the combined probability assignments using the following analytical formulae 
(Wang et al. 2006a, b, 2007): 
r L L 
{Hn}: en = k\ (enj + euj + &H,i) ~ (&H,i + &HJ) n 
; = 1 1 = 1 
r L L 
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1,...,N, 
where 
^n=1 l l l i = 1 \en,i T enj + ejj,i) 1 — W* — 1) lli=1 \eH,i T CH,i) 
The combined probability assignments are normalised into overall belief degrees by 
using the following equations: 
1 
k 
[Hn] : pn IA I 
[H] : pH (A1) 
en 
1 — en 
en 
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where j3n (A1) and PH (A1) represent the overall belief degrees of the combined assess-
ments, assigned to the assessment grades Hn and H, respectively. Note that the last two 
equations provide a normalisation process for proportionally assigning the remaining 
belief en back to the focal elements after the combination of all basic factors. This 
step is necessary as e~n is not a degree of ignorance but the unassigned belief caused 
by the relative importance of the attributes. 
The combined assessment is also a distribution assessment, which can be denoted 
by S(y(A1)) = {(H1,/31(A1)),...,(HN,I3N(A1)),(H,I3H(A1))}. It provides a 
panoramic view of the alternative assessment, from which one can tell which lev-
els the alternative A1 is assessed to and what belief degrees are assigned to all the 
defined levels. 
A1 = ^ ( A 1 ) ) , 
Ai = S(y(A1))., 
AM = S(y(AM)). 
The above formulas together constitute a complete ER analytical algorithm. Com-
pare with evidence combination rule in D-S theory, the ER algorithm has at least the 
following features (Wang et al. 2006b): 
(1) Taking into account the relative importance of evidence. 
(2) Modeling ignorance clearly by breaking down unassigned probability mass into 
two parts and treating them differently. 
(3) Generating rational conclusions in the combination of the multiple pieces of con-
flict evidence (Murphy 2000). Another methodology that generates rational con-
clusions is the Lateo Approach (Campos et al. 2007; Neves et al. 2007). 
The consequence of having interval weights is that overall assessment can no longer be 
certain. In the ER framework, this would lead to intervals of overall combined belief 
degrees. Therefore there is a need to generate the upper and lower bounds of such an 
interval for each combined belief degree. 
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If p~(Al) and p„{Al) are the optimal solutions of the nth min and max prob-
lems for pn(Al), and p^(Al) and p~^(Al) are the optimal solutions of the min 
and max problems for PH(A1) then we have Pn(Al) e [p~(Al), p+(A1)] and 
PH(A1) e [Pfl(Al), Pfl(A1)]. The combined assessment is an interval distribution 
assessment given by 
S(y(Al) = l(Hn, PniA1)), n=l,...,N;(H, pH(Al))\ 
with 
YJPn(Al)+PH(Al) = l. 
n=\ 
N 
1 
Note that βH(A1) is zero if e~H,i = 0 for all i = 1,…,L. This means that the com­
bined assessment for the general attribute is complete if and only if all the original 
assessments for the basic attributes are complete. 
Our approach makes no assumptions about the aggregated functional form, that 
is non-linear in general, and it only requires utility independence among individual 
attributes (Keeney and Raiffa 1993). The ER approach does not result in rank reversal, 
a phenomenon that might occur in analytical hierarchy process (AHP). This is because 
the ER approach models each decision alternative independently. 
Both the D-S/AHP (Beynon et al. 2000, 2001; Beynon 2002a, b, 2005a,b) and the 
ER approaches are developed on the basis of the D-S theory of evidence, but they are 
quite different in nature. The former is an extension of the traditional AHP, while the 
latter has little to do with AHP. So, they are different in many ways such as modeling 
mechanisms, algorithms and so on. Other group decision-making approaches based 
on AHP have been proposed. For example, [Escobar 2003] introduces the so-called 
Aggregation of Individual Preference Structures (AIPS). This procedure incorporates 
ideas similar to Borda count methods and transfers to the case of preference structures 
the principle of aggregation employed in the two approaches traditionally followed 
in AHP-group decision making (aggregation of individual judgments and aggregation 
of individual priorities). In (Gargallo et al. 2007) a Bayesian approach of AHP group 
decision making based on mixtures for group identification is proposed and applied 
to e-democracy. 
However, the attribute aggregation process of the ER approach is more complicated 
than several other multiattribute decision analysis methods, as multiattribute utility 
theory (MAUT). This shortcoming is to a large extent overcome by generating a 
window-based intelligent decision system software package (Xu and Yang 2003) to 
support the implementation of the ER approach. 
2.4 Alternative Expected Utility 
Minimum and maximum utilities are introduced to rank M alternatives. Suppose the 
utility of an assessment level Hn is u (Hn), then the expected utility of the aggregated 
assessment S(y(A1)) is defined as follows: 
N 
u(S(y(A')) = YJβn(Al)u(Hn). 
n—1 
Out of convenience and simplicity, u(S(y(Al))) is usually referred to as the expected 
utility of A1 for short. If the aggregated distribution assessment is incomplete, then 
βH(A1) 7^  0, which may be assigned to any assessment level. When it is assigned to 
the most preferred assessment level HN, u(S(y(A1))) reaches its maximum, which is 
defined by 
N-1 
umax(Al) = ^ βn(Al)u(Hn) + (βN(Al) + βH(Al))u(HN), l=1,...,M. 
n=1 
If PH(A1) is assigned to the least preferred assessment level H1, then u(S(y(A1'))) 
reaches its minimum, defined by 
N 
Wmin(^  ) = (P1(A ) + PH(A ))U{H1) + 2,Pn(A )ll(Hn), I = 1,..., M. 
n—2 
As weights are given as intervals, the above defined utility measures are no longer 
unique. In fact, they become intervals as well. In such cases, we are interested in 
finding the overall maximum and minimum utilities of each alternative rather than 
the upper and lower bounds of either umax(A1) or umin(Al). The overall minimum 
utility for an alternative A1 can be determined by solving the following non-linear 
optimization problem for / = 1,..., M: 
Umin(A ) = min u{H1) + 2_,Pn(A )u{Hn) 
N 
+ 
s.t. 
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N 
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n=1 n=1 
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/ N \ 
eHJ = wA1 -^pnJ(Al) \,i = 1,...,L 
N 
The overall maximum utility can be determined by solving the same non-linear opti-
mization problem using the following objective function: 
;v — 1 
^max(A ) = maxnmax(A ) = / ^ Pn(A )u(Hn) + l/3/v(A ) + PH(A ) I u(Hn). 
Therefore, each budget is still determined by a utility interval, as 
A1 = [t/minCA1), t/maxCA1)], 
A/ EE [UminiA1), Umax(A1)], 
AM = [Umin(A ) , f/max(A )]. 
2.5 Alternative Ranking 
The above information is not meaningful enough to definitively choose a budget. We 
propose a method (Mateos et al. 2007) based on comparing the distances of each 
interval A1 = [Umin(Al), Umax(A1)], I = 1,..., M to some predetermined targets; 
the maximum utility (U+ = maxi \Umax(Al)\) and the minimum utility (U- = 
mini \Umin(A )}). 
The idea is that an alternative is ranked first if its distance to the maximum utility 
(U+) is the smallest, and its distance to the minimum utility (U-) is the greatest. If 
only one of these conditions is satisfied, a solution might be outranked by the others 
depending upon the context of the problem (for example, the attitude of the DM in a 
decision-making situation). Another solution is to define a ratio for each alternative 
A1,1 = 1,..., M, as follows 
, D(A , U-) D(A , U+) 
R(A ) 
DJJ DJJ+ 
where the distance measure from A1 = [Umin(Al), Umax(A1)] to U, (U+ or U-) is 
D(Ai, U) = 
1/2 2 
/ ( \-x (Umax(A1) — Umin(A1)) )—U\ dx 
-1 /2 
1 /
/ / \ 2 / / \ 2 / Umin(A) + f/max(A') \  /f/max(A') — t/min(A')\ ( U ) -\— ( I 
and Djj- = tnaxi \D(A , U)\ and DJJ+ = mini {D(A , £/+)}. 
Note that we can assume, without loss of generality, that Du- > 0 and DJJ+ > 0, 
because, obviously, Du- > 0 and if Du+ = 0 then 
0 = DU+ = min{D(Al, U+)} = D(Ak, U+). 
Therefore, Umax (Ak) = U+ = maxi \Umax (A;)} is a single value and this alternative 
Ak is the best because it has the highest utility and the problem is solved. 
The ratio R(Al) for each alternative A1,1 = 1,..., M, measures how close alter-
native A1 is to the maximum utility U+ and how far away it is from the minimum 
utility U-. Besides, R{Al) < 0,1 = 1,..., M, because 
D(A',U-) 
Du > D(Al, U-) 1 
Dul < D(A>, U+) => 
< 1 
L>u D(Al,U+) 
D u+ 
< - 1 
Note that R(Al) = 0, if Du- = D(Al, U-) and Du+ = D(Al, U+), then A1 is 
the best alternative, because it is both the closest to the maximum utility U+ and 
the farthest away from the minimum utility U-. However, R(Al) < 0, if it does not 
satisfy both equations simultaneously. Besides, the smaller R(Al) is the farther A1 is 
away from U+ and the closer it is to U-. Therefore, the alternative ranking would be 
realized by R(Al ) in decreasing order. 
3 An Example 
In this section we will present a hypothetical example that illustrates the methodology 
that we have introduced and its potential. We consider an electric power problem in 
Spain. Electricity is generated principally at hydroelectric, thermo-electric or nuclear 
plants. Alternative sources of generation are wind, solar power or biomass, among 
others. 
As more countries become industrialized the energy consumption is higher. World 
energy consumption has multiplied by 25 since the last century. In Spain, for exam-
ple, the electric power demand increased from 14,625 million kilowatts in 1960 to 
196,421 million in 2000. To cover this increase in the demand for electric power, 
it becomes necessary to increase generation. Depending on source of generation in 
question the associated environmental, social and economic impact will be differ-
ent. For example, the generation of electric power by burning fossil fuels (oil, gas 
and coal) is known to be extremely pollutant. One of the most serious threats to the 
world environment comes from this pollution: the rapid increase of greenhouse gas 
emissions, especially CO2, is considered by many scientists to be the main culprit for 
overheating the Earth. On the other hand, nuclear plants produce practically no carbon 
dioxide, dioxide of sulphur or oxide of nitrogen emissions. However, Spanish citizens, 
politicians and the mass media continue to react vigorously to any slight accident at a 
nuclear plant. 
To take a decision of this sort, then, it is necessary, besides examining the possible 
alternatives, to think about and try to minimize the possible impact on society, without 
Table 2 Impacts set 
Levels of achievement 
H1: Absolutely negative 
H2: Very negative 
H3: Fairly negatively 
H4: Slightly negative 
H5: Average 
H6: Slightly positive 
H7: Fairly positive 
H8: Very positively 
H9: Absolutely positive 
blocking a good option because it is not very popular. The way to keep up this balance is 
by supporting participatory democracy in conjunction with representative democracy. 
Next we summarize the application of different phases of the proposed methodology 
to the considered problem. 
Problem Definition In Spain 33,868,470 citizens have the right to vote (see http:// 
www.ine.es). Spanish citizens are represented by 350 deputies in the lower house of 
parliament (Congress of Deputies). Spain has an energy deficit and wants to solve this 
problem by generating more and importing less electric power. The necessary electric 
power can be generated as follows: A1 =100% nuclear power, A2 = 100% wind 
power, A3 = 100 % thermal energy, A4 = 100 % solar power and A5 = 40 % solar, 
40 % wind and 20 % nuclear power. 
Let’s suppose that the government wants to take the decision participatively accord-
ing to three attribute that represent the economic (X1,) social (X2) and environmental 
(X3) impact of each alternative. The five alternatives should be clearly explained to 
the citizenship with experts’ reports, where the economic, social and environmental 
impacts of each alternative should be explicitly detailed. 
The citizens must express their beliefs on the impact of each alternative on all the 
attributes, i.e., specify one of the impacts in Table 2 for each alternative and attribute 
or leave unanswered if they do not know. 
Evaluating Criteria Let’s suppose that 10,000 citizens have taken part in the participa-
toryprocess.Therefore, the weightfor each citizen is 1/33, 868,470 = 2.9526x10 -8, 
whereas the weight for each political representative is 33, 858, 470/(33, 868,470 x 
350) = 2.8563 x 10-3. 
Thus, the social impact of nuclear power plants was rated as very negative (H2) by 
2,500 citizens, slightly negative (H4)by 1,200, average (H5)by 2000, slightly positive 
(H6) by 1,700 and fairly positive (H7) by 800, and the other citizens, 10,000-8,200 = 
1,800, did not know or did not want to rate the social impact of nuclear plants. Now, 
the results of political representatives are: 164, 148, 10, 8, 7, 5 and 8 think that the 
social impact of nuclear plants is H2, H3, H4, H5, H6, H7 and H8, respectively. Taken 
together, then we have that the social impact of nuclear plants is as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 Social impact of nuclear plants 
Probability 
# 2 
H3 
H4 
H5 
H6 
H7 
H8 
H 
2, 500 x 1/33, 868, 470 + 164 x 33, 858, 470/(33, 868, 470 x 350) = 0.46851 
148 x 33, 858, 470/(33, 868, 470 x 350) = 0.42273 
1, 200 x 1/33, 868, 470 + 10 x 33, 858, 470/(33, 868, 470 x 350) = 2.8598 x 10 
2, 000 x 1/33, 868, 470 + 8 x 33, 858, 470/(33, 868, 470 x 350) = 2.2909 x 10 
1, 700 x 1/33, 868, 470 + 7 x 33, 858, 470/(33, 868, 470 x 350) = 2.0044 x 10 
800 x 1/33, 868, 470 + 5 x 33, 858, 470/(33, 868, 470 x 350) = 1.4305 x 10 
8 x 33, 858, 470/(33, 868, 470 x 350) = 0.02285 
1, 800 x 1/33, 868, 470 = 5.3147 x 10 
Thus, 
S(X2(A )) = {(H2, 0.468), (H3, 0.423), (H4, 0.028), (i/5, 0.023), (H6, 0.02), 
(H7, 0.014), (H8, 0.023), (H, 0.00005}. 
If the assessment is repeated for each attribute (Xi) and alternative (A1), we get the 
following belief decision matrix 
X1 
1S [X1 (A )j 
S yX1 IA )) 
S (X1 (A )) 
S (X1 (A )) 
S (X1 (A )) 
X2 
S {X2 (A )) 
S {X2 (A J J 
S (X-2 (A )) 
S (X-2 (A )) 
S (X-2 (A )) 
X3 
S [X3 IA ) 
S [X3 IA ) 
S (X3 (A ) 
S (X3 (A ) 
S (X3 (A ) 
]\ 
) 
A1 
A2 
A3 
A4 
A5 
Solving 10 (2 x 5) non-linear optimization problems we obtain for each alternative 
the expected utility intervals shown in Fig. 3, output by means of the GMAA decision 
support system (http://www.dia.fi.upm.es/~ajimenez/GMAA), see e.g. Jiménez et al. 
(2003), 2006a. 
The lower, average and upper expected utility is shown in Fig. 3 for the five alterna-
tives under consideration. The GMAA ranks the alternatives on the basis of the average 
expected utilities. Note that the upper end-point of the utility interval for “Thermal 
Energy” is lower than the lower end-point utility for “Solar Power” and for “Mixture”. 
Thus, “Thermal Energy” is dominated by the other two, and can be discarded. The 
utility intervals for the remaining alternatives are much overlapped, and all of them 
are non-dominated. 
In any case, we calculate the distances of the utility intervals to the maximum and 
minimum utility to find out how robust this ranking is, see Table 4. 
Looking at the third column in the Table 4, we find that the values are decreasing, i.e. 
the first alternative is the furthest from the worst utility and the last one is the closest. In 
the fourth column, the opposite applies, A5 is the closest alternative to the best utility, 
and A2 is the furthest one. Since our aim is to identify the most preferred alternative, 
Table 4 Distances to the maximum and minimum utility 
Alternatives 
A5 : Mixture 
A4 : Solar Power 
A1 : Nuclear 
A2 : Wind Power 
Umin \A J 
0.7645 
0.7234 
0.6578 
0.6866 
Umax \A J 
0.9843 
0.9276 
0.8942 
0.7833 
D(A , U-) 
0.2257 
0.1778 
0.1365 
0.0820 
D(A , U-)-) 
0.1269 
0.1694 
0.2192 
0.2509 
Fig. 3 Alternatives ranking in the GMAA system 
i.e. the furthest from the worst utility and closest to the best one, we conclude that the 
most preferred alternative is generating extra electric power as follows: 40 % solar, 
40% wind and 20 % nuclear power. 
Additionally, as the distance ranking matches up with the one shown in Fig. 3, we 
can conclude that the ranking is robust, and the distance ratio does not need to be 
assessed. 
4 Conclusions 
Nowadays, representative democracy is in crisis, and scientists are proposing partic-
ipatory democracy as a way out. In participatory democracy citizens do express not 
only their preferences in each election of political representatives but they can also 
take part in decision-making problems. There more pros than cons associated with 
this new way of looking at democracy. 
Participatory budgets that are being implemented in a number of countries basically 
consist of allocating part of the locality’s budget to items that the citizens agree to be 
the most important. These agreements are achieved by means of a negotiation process, 
which is normally enacted at regular meetings with the participation of political repre-
sentatives. Through these meetings and on the basis of available information from new 
ICT, they build up a budget aimed at distributing the money that has been allocated. 
The different participatory budgets that are being implemented are very similar and 
differ depending on the locality only. It is true that a few are using scientific methods 
to reach a most preferred budget. 
In the literature we find algorithms aimed at calculating non-dominated budgets 
that account for citizens’ preferences. In this paper we have tried to take the state of 
the art forward by assuming that several feasible alternatives exist and the problem 
is to select the one that best meets citizens’ needs. If all the citizens take part in the 
decision-making process, the participation of political representatives would not be 
necessary. Nevertheless, this is a Utopian case since there are many circumstances 
preventing citizens from taking part. This is the reason why we believe that political 
representatives must represent those citizens that do not take part in the participatory 
process. 
The methodology we propose assumes that there are different alternatives and one is 
selected on the basis of how well they perform for an objective set. It has the following 
phases: 
1. Citizens and political representatives who take part in the participatory process 
express their preferences through some sort of ICT. 
2. The system aggregates the preferences to get a probability mass of the performance 
of the alternatives for the identified attributes. It is assumed that the political 
representatives represent the percentage of citizens who have not taken part in the 
participatory process. 
3. The system aggregates the attributes using a methodology based on the D-S theory 
of evidence. It calculates the probability mass of the possible values the overall 
objective can take when applying each alternative. 
4. An expected utility is assessed for each alternative. 
5. Alternatives, which are represented by utility intervals, are ranked on the basis of 
a distance notion that takes into account all the values of the utility interval. 
Summarizing, we proposed an approach in which citizens and political representatives 
can express their preferences concerning different feasible alternatives to achieve spe-
cific attributes. Budgets were ranked depending on the citizens’ preferences. Finally, 
an illustrative example was given. 
This research opens up many other lines concerning participatory processes. Some 
of them follow. First, it can be almost directly extended to the situation in which each 
objective has its own assessment scale, even if some are quantitative and others are 
qualitative. On the other hand, the decision-makers’ preferences could be imprecise. 
Additionally, a strict dominance notion has been considered, and more meaningful 
information could be output if a week dominance definition is assumed. 
Acknowledgments The paper was supported by Madrid Regional Government project S-2009/ESP-1685 
and the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation project MTM2011-28983-C03-03. 
Prof. Sixto Ríos-Insua, co-author of this paper, recently passed away after a long illness. Sixto was a 
member of the Spanish Royal Doctoral Academy and co-founder and first president of the Spanish Group 
on MCDM. He co-authored more than 70 papers in international scientific journals, headed 14 national 
and international research projects, and received several prestigious awards. His teachings, inspiration and 
spirit will remain among us. 
References 
Abers R (1998) From clientelism to cooperation: local government, participatory policy, and civic organizing 
in Porto Alegre Brazil. Politics Soc 26:511–523 
Baierle S (2004) The case of Porto Alegre: the politic and background. In: Roussopoulos D, Benello CG 
(eds) Participatory democracy: prospects for democratizing democracy. Black Rose Books, Montreal, 
pp 175–236 
Barber B (2000) Which technology for which democracy? Which democracy for which technology? Int J 
Commun Law Policy 6:1–8 
de Sousa Santos B (1998) Participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre: towards a redistributive democracy. 
Politics Soc 26:461–510 
Beynon M (2002a) DS/AHP method: a mathematical analysis, including an understanding of uncertainty. 
Eur J Oper Res 140(1):148–164 
Beynon M (2002b) An investigation of the role of scale values in the DS/AHP method of MCDM. J 
Multi-Criteria Decis Anal 11:327–343 
Beynon M (2005a) Understanding local ignorance and non-specificity within the DS/AHP method of multi-
criteria decision making. Eur J Oper Res 163(2):403–417 
Beynon M(2005b)A method of aggregation in DS/AHP for group decision-making with the non-equivalent 
importance of individuals in the group. Comput Oper Res 32(7):1881–1896 
Beynon M, Curry B, Morgan P (2000) The Dempster–Shafer theory of evidence: an alternative approach 
to multicriteria decision modelling. Omega 28:37–50 
Beynon M, Cosker D, Marshall D (2001) An expert system for multi-criteria decision making using 
Dempster–Shafer theory. Expert Syst Appl 20:357–367 
Brownlow SA, Watson SR (1987) Structuring multi-attribute value hierarchies. J Oper Res Soc 38:309–317 
Campos F, Neves A, Campello de Souza FM (2007) Decision making under uncertainty. IEEE symposium 
on computational intelligence in multicriteria decision making, vol 1–5, pp 85–90 
Gargallo P, Moreno-Jiménez JM, Salvador M (2007) AHP-group decision making: a Bayesian approach 
based on mixtures for group identification. Group Decis Negotiat 16:485–506 
Habermas J (1989) Structural transformation of the public sphere. MIT Press, Cambridge 
Jiménez A, Mateos A, Ríos-Insua S (2005) Monte Carlo simulation techniques in a decision support system 
for group decision-making. Group Decis Negotiat 14:109–130 
Jiménez A, Ríos-Insua S, Mateos A (2003) A decision support system for multiattribute utility evaluation 
based on imprecise assignments. Decis Support Syst 36:65–79 
Jiménez A, Ríos-Insua S, Mateos A (2006a) A generic multi-attribute analysis system. Comput Oper Res 
33:1081–1101 
Jiménez A, Ríos-Insua S, Mateos A (2006b) Using a combination of weighting methods in multiattribute 
decision-making. In: Haasis H-D, Kopfert H, Schönberger J (eds) Operations research proceedings 2005. 
Springer, Berlin, pp 767–772 
Keeney RL, Raiffa H (1993) Decisions with multiple objectives. Wiley, New York 
Kim J (2008) A model and case for supporting participatory public decision making in e-democracy. Group 
Decis Negotiat 17(3):179–193 
Latendresse A (2004) The case of Porto Alegre: the participatory budget. In: Roussopoulos D, Benello CG 
(eds) Participatory democracy: prospects for democratizing democracy. Black Rose Books, Montreal, 
pp 287–291 
Mateos A, Ríos-Insua S, Jiménez A (2007) Dominance, potential optimality and alternative ranking in 
imprecise multi-attribute models. J Oper Research Soc 58:326–336 
Murphy CK (2000) Combining belief functions when evidence conflicts. Decis Support Syst 29:1–9 
Mustajoki J, Hämäläinen RP, Salo A (2005) Decision support by interval SMART/SWING—incorporating 
imprecision in the SMART and SWING methods. Decis Sci 36(2):317–339 
Neves AM, Campos FFC, Souza FMC (2007) The Lateo approach: a way to model the premises of the 
subjective uncertainty. Int J Inf Technol Intell Comput 2:85 
Pöyhönen M, Hämäläinen RP (2001) On the convergence of multiattribute weighting methods. Eur J Oper 
Res 129(3):569–585 
Ríos J, Ríos Insua D (2008) A framework for participatory budget elaboration support. J Oper Res Soc 
59:203–212 
Souza CU (2001) Participatory budgeting in Brazilian cities: limits and possibilities in building democratic 
institutions. Environ Urban 13:159–184 
Stewart T (1992) A critical survey on the status of multiple criteria decision making theory and practice. 
OMEGA 20:569–586 
UN-HABITAT (2004) 72 frequently asked questions about participatory budgeting, Urban Governance 
Toolkit Series 
Wang Y-M, Yang J-B, Xu D-L (2006a) Environmental impact assessment using the evidential reasoning 
approach. Eur J Oper Res 174:1885–1913 
Wang Y-M, Yang J-B, Xu D-L, Chin K-S (2006b) The evidential reasoning approach for multiple attribute 
decision analysis using interval belief degree. Eur J Oper Res 175:35–66 
Wang Y-M, Yang J-B, Xu D-L, Chin K-S (2007) On the combination and normalization of interval-valued 
belief structures. Inf Sci 177:1230–1247 
Weber M, Borchering K (1993) Behavioral influences on weight judgements in multiattribute decision 
making. Eur J Oper Res 67:1–12 
Xu DL, Yang JB (2003) Intelligent decision system for self-assessment. J Multi-Criteria Decis Anal 12:43– 
60 
